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In the middle 1960's, a number of projects were initiated to 
clarify the history of quantum mechanics. A team headed by 
Thomas S. Kuhn assembled the Sources for the History of Quantum 
Physics, an archive which has since become a universally recog- 
nized model in the art of recording contemporary history. Max 
Jammer presented a conceptual history of quantum mechanics, using 
as experience his own informative series in the history of fun- 
damental physical concepts. Bartel L. van der Waerden gave to 
the English-reading public an annotated collection of the basic 
papers in the development of quantum mechanics. 
Friedrich Hund's Geschichte der Quantentheorie (1967) was 
part of this broad effort. Hund presented the development of 
quantum mechanics as historique rather than as grande histoire. 
Although he made tantalizing allusions to unpublished letters, 
his study was based largely on printed material. Hund's 
Geschichte revealed him as a most sensitive participant in the 
events of the 1920's. Some of his perception is due to his 
presence at Gtlttingen, where he was familiar with both the theo- 
retical and experimental sides of quantum mechanics. In his 
book Hund seeks the intellectual problem situations which 
characterized the development of quantum theory. These he recon- 
structs by examining, at appropriate junctures, reasoning not 
present but nonetheless possible. To say that he has isolated 
specific problematiques would be to stretch his argument, but in 
this direction his sympathies clearly lie. 
Into his~analysis Hund introduces a number of important themes 
which, unfortunately, the brief length of his book does not allow 
him to develop. Of these, two are of interest to the broader 
community of historians of science and mathematics. The first 
deals with the way center-periphery relationships contributed to 
the formation or to the promotion of specific scientific concepts. 
If the first theme may be described as the dialectic between 
society and ideas, then the second may be expressed as the 
dialectic between form and content. In this theme, one addresses 
the relationship between machines and ideas, or what is often 
seen as the relationship between technology and science. Of 
more immediate interest for the readers of Historia Mathematics, 
under the second theme we may investigate the relationship between 
physics and mathematics. 
As far as the first theme is concerned, it would seem that 
the mere coherence of,a social situation with an arbitrarily 
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selected framework for ideas -- however vastly this structure 
might be conceived -- is insufficient. As Paul Forman has argued 
so persuasively, mere concordance cannot be a vehicle for social 
history [Forman 1971, 31. Hund considers the first "sociological" 
theme at many points in his study, but he does not develop it. 
He mentions but does ,not clarify the specific impact of the Got- 
tingen Bohr-Fest in 1922 (p. 106) or of Max Born's 1923-24 lec- 
tures on Atommechanik. The reader learns that, during the period 
before the 1920's, Arnold Sommerfeld's school at Munich used 
spectral analysis as an expedient, perhaps as a budgetary device 
to justify expenditures in other areas, in order to develop the 
quantum theory (p. 84). An elaboration of Sommerfeld's success 
in acquiring funds for pure science during the most difficult 
of social circumstances might clarify the path taken by quantum 
theory during during the period before 1920; certainly many 
research programs at other universities, such as Manchester, 
Guttingen, and Leipzig, were destroyed by the war. 
Although centers of research are important in Hund's overall 
historical perspective, he finds it difficult to introduce them 
into the argument in a natural way. Centers imply a center- 
periphery dynamic, and this Hund only suggests at several points. 
As he remarks, for those on the social and geographical periphery 
of science, publication in a prestigious scientific journal was 
not sufficient to insure that an idea find an appropriate 
audience. One case is that of Jun Ishiwara's work on multiply- 
periodic functions (p. 84). Ishiwara was one of several Japan- 
ese physicists who studied in Europe before the First World War. 
His work on Hermann Minkowski's electrodynamics drew Einstein's 
attention (unfavorably, we might add) in 1909, and he attempted 
to develop a theory of gravitation in the period after 1912. 
Nevertheless, his work was not widely recognized after he re- 
turned to Japan and after a love affair forced him to resign 
from university life [Hirosige 19731. Wladyslaw Natanson's 1911 
anticipation of Bose statistics is another case in point (p. 145). 
Natanson was a theoretical physicist at the Jagiellonian Univer- 
sity in Cracow. According to his only student, Leopold Infeld, 
"He was lonely both in science and in life, and the impersonality 
of his relations with people was his protective armour.... As 
a result of his isolation, his lack of personal contact, he 
didn't develop to his full scientific capacity" [Infeld 19641. 
One should mention here that it is equally useful to orient a 
center-periphery axis by disciplines as well as by geography. 
For example, Hund observes that quantum physics appropriated 
perturbation methods from astronomy through the work of Karl 
Schwarzschild and Paul Epstein. 
One way of making concrete the notion of center-periphery 
dynamics is to consider the ideologies and problematic foci of 
scientific schools. In quantum mechanics, several centers devel- 
oped into schools largely as a result of strong personalities: 
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Paul Ehrenfest’s critical spirit permeated Leiden; Bohr’s 
philosophical and physical approach was the center of physics 
at Copenhagen; Sommerfeld’s mathematical physics guided much of 
the physical research in Munich. On the other hand, no single 
personality suffices to explain the style of other schools; many 
tendencies, for example, contributed to mathematical physics at 
Gbttingen. 
As Hund suggests in his text, dynamic tensions between mathe- 
matical formalism and physical content constitute an appropriate 
theme for examining the role of schools in quantum mechanics. 
Hund presents this dialectic on one level by emphasizing, all 
too briefly, the way physical hardware influenced the develop- 
ment of mathematical spectral theories. More generally, Hund 
feels that the formalism and the physical interpretation of 
quantum mechanics developed simultaneously during the period 
after 1920 (p. 155). Furthermore, by 1922 physicists did not 
realize that an understanding of complicated spectra was not 
necessary for completing the foundations of quantum mechanics, 
and that the latter would contribute little to explaining spec- 
tra (p. 112). Unfortunately, Hund elaborates these points only 
indirectly. 
Werner Heisenberg, another participant in these events, has 
referred to his efforts in the years before 1926 as wandering 
in a “fog. ” Surely, however, recounting such sleepwalking is 
not all that an historian might hope to accomplish. The critical 
question, perhaps, lies in examining the headlong rush, after 
1925, to place quantum mechanics on an axiomatic basis. Before 
1925, there existed bastard axiomatic programs which built on 
ideas from classical mechanics. One wonders why the axiomatic 
version of quantum mechanics was more appealing than other candi- 
dates. As Hund notes, “By the spring of 1926, there were four 
apparently equivalent versions of quantum mechanics. The matrix 
formulation based on Heisenberg’s work, Dirac’s mechanics of 
q-numbers, Born and Wiener’s preliminary attempts at a calculus 
of operators and Schredinger’s wave equation” (p. 154). Hund 
details how all versions were subsequently reconciled, but we 
do not appreciate why the resulting “classical” formulation of 
quantum mechanics was, and still largely is, introduced axiomat- 
ically. 
In one passage, Hund indirectly provides us with an important 
approach to the problem. When he introduces the de Broglie 
matter waves and the Schrbdinger equation, Hund notes that one 
may explain the quantum theory “as a completely non-intuitive 
unification of two intuitive pictures, i.e., classical particles 
and classical waves of fields” (p. 141). One wonders whether 
most other physicists of the same period, contemporaries of Hund, 
also held to the Kantian notion of intuition’s morphology. I 
suspect that the case is more complicated than Hund reveals. 
In the period before 1920, many conceptions of intuition’s role 
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in mathematical science, proposed by Henri Poincare, Felix Klein, 
L.E.J. Brouwer, Henri Bergson, and Hermann Weyl to name a few, 
had been widely discussed. One would be interested to learn how 
physicists working in quantum theory used the word “intuitive” 
and whether they were influenced by formalist attempts in the 
early decades of the twentieth century to minimize the importance 
of “intuition” in mathematical demonstrations. Was axiomati za- 
tion a coach-in-the-ready for a new quantum mechanics? Several 
research programs might help us understand the extent to which 
the axiomatic approach penetrated physical science before 1925. 
One such program stems from Paul Forman’s [1971] study of deter- 
minism and acausality in Weimar Germany. Here we could begin by 
outlining the incidence of axiomatic approaches in physics from 
1918 to 1925. Furthermore, we could see whether axiomatization 
was associated with the disciplinary tendency called “mathematical 
physics” to a greater degree than with the discipline of theo- 
retical physics, the latter of whose practitioners often 
emphasized the intuitive, physical character of nature’s laws. 
Of clear importance is the educational process. Thus, we might 
expect a systematic study of doctoral dissertations in the 
period 1900-1925 to reveal a significant shift in attitudes 
relating to the role of intuition and formalism in mathematics 
and physics. 
Lest these tasks seem to require the energies of a lifetime, 
we may profit from a concept well-used but, to my knowledge, 
little mentioned in history: the utility of what appears to be 
the marginal case. That is, the use of dysfunction and apparent 
anomaly for understanding the usual case, the symbiosis of 
pathology and physiology. In history of science, this orienta- 
tion is familiar in examing “failures.” But we should be 
sympathetic, as well, to examining what at first seem to be 
marginal currents existing beside those which were canonized at 
a later date. Here, the fruitfulness of Cyril Stanley Smith’s 
studies in metallurgy and Herbert Odom’s investigations of pre- 
Darwinian agricultural theory come to mind. For quantum 
mechanics, we might like to know whether developments in the 
theories of relativity, often seen (incorrectly, I think) as 
marginal to the development of twentieth century physics, help 
us understand the discourse which led to quantum mechanics. 
David Hilbert’s attempt to create an axiomatic foundation for 
general relativity, so distinct from Einstein’s search for intui- 
tive physical principles, is surely one appropriate contrast in 
this connection. 
Why should these approaches, representing only several from 
among a constellation, be introduced in what the reader expects 
to be a review of a book translated seven years after it was 
issued? Certainly, the reader hopes, those who would attempt the 
history of quantum mechanics can already read Hund in his native 
tongue and thus avoid the often clumsy and confusing English 
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version Gordon Reece has given us. Does not the translation, 
however, provide us with an occasion to consider the maturity of 
the discipline to which we adhere? Let us see whether this 
contention might lead to a constructive self-evaluation. 
The freshness of Hund's book, the same still characterizing 
the work of Jammer and van der Waerden, stems only partly from 
his extraordinary perception, cultivated over so many years. 
In large measure, it is symptomatic that enormously powerful 
historical orientations have affected but marginally the work of 
most historians concerned with the mathematical sciences. For 
example, quantitative history (distinct from exploratory forays 
into quantitative techniques) has just been injected into our 
discourse with the publication of Paul Forman, John Heilbron, 
and Spencer Weart's Dreitinnerarbeit [Forman et al. 1975?] 
The concept of ideology, current in other historical studies for 
many years, has only recently been used to address the mathemat- 
ical sciences with any subtleness. Of serial history in general 
[Chaunu 1964; Marczewski 19641, of linguistic analysis, of the 
new archaeological approach of Michel Foucault, we have no 
examples. 
Historians of mathematics and science are fortunate to have 
as a champion of their craft -- shall we say of their science? 
-- the great humanist Paul ValBry. More than any other major 
contemporary literary figure, Valery saw mathematics and science 
as the spring of metaphor. One wonders, however, whether meta- 
phor is sufficient for historians of mathematical science. Marc 
BlochIs beautiful correction of ValBry's reproach for "traditional 
history" is surely relevant here. Valery cites the "conquest 
of the earth" by electricity as a critical omission in the work 
of traditional historians, even though this event had "more mean- 
ing and greater possibilities of shaping our immediate future 
than all the political events combined." It is to ValBry's 
subsequent argument that the sources for such a study of elec- 
tricity are in principle inaccessible, that Bloch counters: 
"Who believes that the electrical companies have no archives, no 
records of consumption, no charts of the enlargement of their 
networks? This truth is that the historians until now have 
simply neglected to question these documents" [Bloch 1953, 661. 
Nearly two generations have passed since Bloch and Lucien Febvre 
founded the Annales ESC, yet have any of their innovations been 
addressed by historians of mathematics? 
Is not part of the problem that, until recently, historians 
of the physical sciences have not seen themselves as historians 
in the most general sense of the word? One of the few historians 
of science to have held this position with passion, Charles 
Culotta, in his courses at Bryn Mawr College and at the Univer- 
sity of Pennsylvania, insisted upon a close attention to historio- 
graphy, methodology, and to the philosophy of history. Before 
his tragic and premature death, he introduced many students to 
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the craft of the historian. Today, attempts to bring economic, 
social and cultural history to bear on the history of science 
are being initiated. Tangible results, however, are just being 
realized. 
For the historian of the contemporary mathematical sciences, 
and particularly for the reader of Hund's book, this discussion 
implies a recognition that the importance of what the historian 
writes -- whether this production is called his art, his science, 
his industry, or his &aft -- lies in its method. Historical 
narrative without method, even if its purpose is clear, is only 
a half-finished product. In this sense, Hund's book, presenting 
the best short account of the development of quantum mechanics, 
should indicate for us the watershed of a divide, on the other 
side of which we may enter into entirely new fields of historical 
explanation. 
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